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NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc.:
The Effect of a Nonpresumption as to
Striker Replacements' Union Sentiments
on the Good-Faith Doubt Defense
I. INTRODUCTION
In the 1980s employer hiring of permanent replacements increased,
prompting concern by the AFL-CIO.1 AFL-CIO pressure has led to the
introduction of legislation in the House of Representatives2 and the Senate3
which would ban the hiring of permanent replacements.' This campaign is
a high priority for the AFL-CIO because it feels that "the permanent
replacement of strikers is a key element in ... [the] strategy" to eliminate
unions.5
One of the reasons why the hiring of permanent replacements is such a
threat to unionism is because an employer may seek to use the fact that his
work force is composed of a substantial number of replacements to justify its
refusal to bargain with or its withdrawal of recognition from the union. If
permanent replacements are presumed to oppose the union, then when
permanent replacements make up fifty percent or more of the bargaining
unit, the employer, charged with committing an unfair labor practice for its
See N.Y. Times, Sept. 30, 1986, at A18, col. 1 (comments of Professor Charles
Perry, Wharton Business School); AFL-CIO Continues Media Blitz, LAB. REL. REP.
(BNA) 498, 499 (Aug. 20, 1990) (In a General Accounting Office survey, two-thirds of
employers and 90% of unions polled "said they believed that permanent replacements
were hired less often in the late 1970s than in the late 1980s.")
2 H.R. 5, 102 Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). The House passed H.R. 5 in July of 1991.
This victory for the AFL-CIO has been termed a "hollow" one because the vote in the
House, 247-182, fell short of the two-thirds margin necessary to override an anticipated
veto by President Bush. See House Passes Striker Replacement Bill, 137 Lab. Rel. Rep.
(BNA) 399 (July 29, 1991).
' S. 55, 102 Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). S. 55 is the companion bill to H.R. 5 already
passed by the House. See supra note 2. The Senate is expected to vote on S.55 sometime
this fall.
4 The AFL-CIO has also filed a complaint with the International Labor Organization
charging that the Mackay Radio doctrine allowing employers to hire permanent
replacements for economic strikers violates ILO Convention 87. AFL-CIO Complains of
Strike Replacement Policy, 134 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 504, 504 (Aug. 20, 1990).
s Id. at 505 (statement by James E. Baker, AFL-CIO European representative).
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
refusal to bargain with or recognize the union, could defend against these
charges by asserting that it had a good-faith doubt that the union enjoyed
majority support.
However, in Buckley Broadcasting Corp. (Station KKHI)6 the National
Labor Relations Board ("Board") rejected the presumption that replacements
oppose the union as well as the presumption that replacements favor the
union. In place of these presumptions that the Board had employed in the
past, the Board adopted a nonpresumption. Employing the nonpresumption,
the Board will neither presume that replacements oppose nor favor the union.
Rather, the Board will require an employer charged with violating sections
8(a)(5) and (1) of the National Labor Relations Act ("the Act")1 to produce
further evidence that the union lacks majority support, beyond the mere fact
that replacements make up fifty percent of the bargaining unit, in order for
the employer to justify its refusal to bargain with or recognize the union. In
NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc. 8 the Supreme Court, in a 5-4
decision, gave its approval to the Board's nonpresumption, holding that such
an approach is rational and consistent with the Act.9
Part II of this Comment will describe the legal background of the good-
faith doubt defense and the Board's varying approaches to the question of
replacements' union sentiments. Part III will detail the facts and the Court's
holding and reasoning in Curtin Matheson. Part IV will analyze the effect of
the nonpresumption on the good-faith doubt defense, concluding that the
effect is basically the same as that of the Board's prior striker replacement
presumption-the employer will be required to produce some further
evidence of replacements' anti-union sentiments in order to support his good-
faith doubt. Part V will discuss what further evidence of replacements' anti-
union sentiments will be sufficient to support the employer's good-faith
doubt. It will conclude that, if this further evidence must be direct evidence
of the replacements' expressed desires to repudiate the union, rather than
circumstantial evidence, from which one might infer that the replacements
oppose the union, then the good-faith doubt defense has collapsed into the
proof-in-fact rule. Assuming that this collapse has occurred, Part VI will
examine the conflict between the proof-in-fact rule and the Board's
safeguards on employer polling of employees. Finally, Part VII will support
the approach which the Court in Curtin Matheson sees the Board as taking:
6 284 N.L.R.B. 1339 (1987), enforced 891 F.2d 230 (9th Cir. 1989).
1 National Labor Relations Act §§ 8(a)(5) and (1), 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(5) and (1)
(1988).
8 110 S. Ct. 1542 (1990).
9 Id. at 1554.
[Vol. 52:919
CURTIN MATHESON
the Board will not presume either that replacements oppose or support the
union, but will give weight to' certain circumstantial evidence that an
employer may produce as further evidence of the replacements' anti-union
sentiments. Part VII will also conclude that this approach is a better
alternative from a policy standpoint than reverting to the presumption that
replacements oppose the union or eliminating the good-faith doubt defense
in favor of the proof-in-fact rule.
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. The Mackay Doctrine
Sections 7 and 13 of the Act guarantee to employees the right to
strike.1° It is unlawful for an employer to fire employees for exercising this
right. However, this right is not without limitations. One such limitation is
imposed by permissible countermeasures taken by employers faced with
strikes.1 The employer's right to hire permanent replacement workers for
economic strikers is a permissible countermeasure which has been criticized
as especially destructive of the employees' right to strike. 2 In its 1938
decision in NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., the Supreme Court
stated that "although section 13 [of the Act] provides, 'nothing in this Act
shall be construed so as to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way
the right to strike,' it does not follow that an employer, guilty of no act
denounced by the statute, has lost the right to protect and continue his
business by supplying places left vacant by strikers."3
10 Section 7 guarantees employees a broad right to engage in "concerted activities."
29 U.S.C. § 157. Section 13 is more specific: "Nothing in this [Act], except as
specifically provided for herein, shall be construed so as either to interfere with or
impede or diminish in any way the right to strike, or to affect the limitations or
qualifications on that right." 29 U.S.C. § 163.
11 R. GORMAN, BASIc TExT ON LABOR LAW-UNIONIZATION AND COLLECrIVE
BARGAINING 297 (1976).
12 An "economic striker" is one engaged in a strike in support of bargaining
demands, as opposed to unfair labor practice strikers who engage in a strike in protest
of unfair labor practices by the employer. See R. GORMAN, supra note 11, at 339.
13 304 U.S. 333, 345 (1938). While this statement was made in dicta, it has been
accepted as the law. See, e.g., NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 225 (1963);
Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491, 526 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Commentators have criticized the Mackay Court's assumption that the employer's
right to continue operating his business in the face of a strike necessarily means he must
have the right to hire permanent replacements for the strikers. See Estreicher, Strikers
and Replacements, 38 LABOR L.. 287, 289 (May 1987); Weinstein, The Anomalous
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Mackay also established that, despite the fact that economic strikers
remain "employees" under section 2(3) of the Act,14 they have no right to
automatic reinstatement at the conclusion of the strike."5 Instead, the
employer need only put the strikers on a preferential hiring list and hire them
as positions become available; the employer is not required to discharge the
permanent replacement workers to make room for the returning strikers.
Because strikers denied automatic reinstatement often cannot afford to wait
for an opening, "there is often ... no practical difference between discharge
of and permanent replacement of strikers."16
B. The Good-Faith Doubt Defense
Upon certification 7 or recognition, 8 a union enjoys an irrebuttable
presumption of majority support for one year. During this one-year period,
an employer's refusal to bargain with the union is a per se violation of
sections 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. At the end of the one-year period, the
Mackay Doctrine Permits the Permanent Replacement of Strikers-Even Though 7hey
Can't Be Fired, 7 CALIF. LAW. 44, 47 (Apr. 1987); Note, The Mackay Doctrine and the
Myth of Business Necessity, 50 TEx. L. REv. 782 (1972). Alternatives to hiring
permanent replacements include operation by managerial and supervisory employees,
hiring of temporary replacements, and contracting out work usually performed by
strikers. See C. PERRY, A. KRAMER, & T. SCHNEIDER, OPERATING DURING STRIKES:
COMPANY EXPERIENCE, NLRB POLICIES, AND GOVERNMENTAL REGULATIONS 63-66
(Industrial Research Unit, The Wharton School, Univ. of Pa., Labor Relations and Public
Policy Series No. 23, 1982).
14 Mackay, 304 U.S. at 345. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3).
1- Mackay, 304 U.S. at 345-46. In contrast, unfair labor practice strikers must be
automatically reinstated by the employer at the conclusion of the strike.
16 AFL-CIO Complains of Strike-Replacement Policy, 134 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA)
504, 505 (Aug. 20, 1990) (quoting James E. Baker, AFL-CIO European representative,
in a letter written to the International Labor Organization's Freedom of Association
Branch).
17 See Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96, 103-04 (1954).
11 See NLRB v. Physicians & Surgeons Community Hosp., 577 F.2d 305, 307 (5th
Cir. 1978).
19 Celanese Corp. of Am., 95 N.L.R.B. 664, 672 (1951); R. GORMAN, supra note
11, at 109.
Section 8(a)(5) provides: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer to
refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees, subject to the
provisions of section 9(a)." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5). A violation of § 8(a)(5) will
derivatively violate § 8(a)(1) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), which makes it an unfair
labor practice "to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed by section 7." For simplicity's sake, the remainder of this Comment
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presumption that the union represents a majority of the bargaining unit
employees continues, but is rebuttable.'
The employer may challenge the incumbent union's majority status by
refusing to bargain with it. If the employer does so, the union has two
options. First, it can petition for a new representation election in which it can
prove its majority status and obtain recertification. However, if the union is
at all uncertain of its majority position, for example because the bargaining
unit is now composed of a substantial number of permanent replacements
who may oppose the union, it will want to avoid an election.2' The second,
more commonly chosen option is for the union to file a section 8(a)(5) charge
against the employer. Section 8(a)(5) makes it an unfair labor practice for the
employer to refuse to bargain with the majority representative of its
employees.?
As a defense to an 8(a)(5) charge, an employer may rebut the
presumption that the union is supported by a majority of the bargaining unit
employees. The Board has recognized two ways in which this may be done.
First, the employer can produce evidence that the union did not in fact have
majority support at the time of the employer's refusal to bargain. 3 This is
referred to as the "proof-in-fact rule."
Second, the employer can rebut the presumption of continuing majority
status by "presenting evidence of a sufficient objective basis for a reasonable
doubt of the union's majority status at the time the employer refused to
bargain."2 This is referred to as the "good-faith doubt defense." This label
is a misnomer, however, since the defense is not merely subjective, but
will refer only to § 8(a)(5), unless otherwise specified.
o Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27, 38 (1987).
21 R. GORMAN, supra note 11, at 108.
' The source of the majority rule principle is § 9(a) of the Act which provides that
"[r]epresentatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by the
majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive
representatives of all the employees in such unit .... " 29 U.S.C. § 159(a).
2 Station KKHI, 284 N.L.R.B. 1339, 1340 (1987), enforced 891 F.2d 230 (9th Cir.
1989).
24 Id.
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contains an objective element: a good-faith reasonable doubt is what is
required.'
Under the good-faith doubt defense, an employer's proof of a reasonable
good-faith doubt is a complete defense to an 8(a)(5) charge;' the Board will
not inquire into whether the union in fact represents a majority. Because the
good-faith doubt defense requires only proof of objective evidence supporting
a good-faith doubt and not proof-in-fact that the union has lost its majority
representative status, the employer will opt to use the good-faith doubt
defense and not the proof-in-fact rule to rebut the presumption of continued
majority status. Part V of this Comment will discuss whether the good-faith
doubt defense survives Curtin Matheson or whether it has been collapsed into
the proof-in-fact rule.
An employer who has hired permanent replacements may submit this
fact to the Board as objective evidence supporting its good-faith doubt.
Because permanent replacements are considered "employees" and hence
bargaining unit members under the Act, their union sentiments "count" for
purposes of determining whether the union represents a majority.27 The
Board has struggled with whether it should presume these replacements are
pro-union, anti-union, or whether their union sentiments cannot be presumed
one way or the other.
I Comment, Application of the Good-Faith-Doubt Test to the Presumption of
Continued Majority Status of Incumbent Unions, 1981 DuKE L.J. 718, 721 n.19.
26 See Celanese Corp. of Am., 95 N.L.R.B. 664, 671 (1951). A different version
of the good-faith doubt defense was articulated by the Board in Stoner Rubber Co. v.
NLRB, 123 N.L.R.B. 1440 (1959). Under the Stoner approach, the employer's showing
of a good-faith doubt is not a complete defense. The employer's showing of a good-faith
doubt rebuts the presumption of union majority status and shifts the burden to the General
Counsel to prove that the union in fact represented a majority of the employees at the
time of the employer's refusal to bargain. Although Stoner has never been overruled or
expressly rejected by the Board, "[r]ecent Board decisions have moved away from the
Stoner rationale in favor of the Celanese approach." Comment, supra note 25, at 723;
see, e.g., Automated Business Sys., 205 N.L.R.B. 532 (1973), enforcement denied, 497
F.2d 262 (6th Cir. 1974). For a full discussion of the distinction between the Celanese
and Stoner approaches to the good-faith doubt defense see Comment, supra note 25.
27 National Labor Relations Act § 2(3), 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1988). See also Pacific
Tile & Porcelain Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 1358, 1360 (1962) (holding that permanent
replacements for economic strikers are eligible to vote in board elections).
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C. The Board's Struggle to Deal with the Question of Replacements'
Union Sentiments: The Gorman Presumption, the Striker Replacement
Presumption and the Nonpresumption
1. The Gorman Presumption
Two competing policy values embodied in the NLRA-industrial
stability' and employee free choice9-have guided the Board's treatment
of an employer's hiring of replacements as an objective factor in the good-
faith doubt defense. It has long been the practice of the Board when dealing
with regular employee turnover to presume that new employees support the
union in the same proportion as those they replace.' In this context, the
need for industrial stability outweighs the principle of employee free choice.
If an employer could rid itself of the union merely on the basis of regular
employee turnover, this would lead to industrial chaos.
A very different situation is presented when the change in the
composition of the workforce is due to the employer's hiring of replacement
workers during a strike. The Board's earliest position on this issue was to
28 The concern for industrial stability may be seen in § 1 of the Act:
Experience has proved that protection by law of the right of employees to organize
and bargain collectively safeguards commerce from injury, impairment, or
interruption, and promotes the flow of commerce by removing certain recognized
sources of industrial strife and unrest, by encouraging practices fundamental to the
friendly adjustment of industrial disputes arising out of differences as to wages,
hours, or other working conditions, and by restoring equality of bargaining power
between employers and employees.
29 U.S.C. § 151. For a full discussion of industrial stability as a policy consideration
affecting the Board's good-faith doubt analysis see Comment, supra note 25, at 728-39.
29 The concern with the maximization of employee free choice may be seen in § 7
of the Act:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing,
and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining
or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any
or all of such activities ....
29 U.S.C. § 157. For a full discussion of employee free choice as a policy consideration
affecting the Board's good-faith doubt analysis see Comment, supra note 25, at 730-38.
30 See, e.g., National Plastic Prods. Co., 78 N.L.R.B. 699, 706 (1948).
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
presume that replacement workers oppose the union.3 This position has
become known as the Gorman presumption after Professor Robert A.
Gorman's statement that "if a new hire agrees to serve as a replacement for
a striker (in union parlance, as a strikebreaker, or worse), it is generally
assumed that he does not support the union and that he ought not to be
counted toward a union majority."32 This position is certainly in line with
"what would seem to be commonsense assumptions"33 about the views of
replacement workers. It seems reasonable to assume that a "scab" who
crosses a union picket line to permanently replace a striking worker does not
support the union. This assumption is especially compelling when one
considers that the union will almost inevitably demand that the employer oust
the replacements to make way for returning strikers and that replacements are
often the targets of striker violence and threats.
If these "commonsense assumptions"are true and replacements do
oppose the union, then the Gorman presumption furthers employee free
choice by allowing the employer to withdraw recognition from the union
when replacements make up at least fifty percent of the bargaining unit.'
Employees will then be free to either recertify the incumbent union,
participate in the organization of a different union, or refrain from union
activity altogether.
On the other hand, if the employer is not permitted to use evidence that
his hiring of replacement workers has created a situation in which the
incumbent union does not enjoy majority support, the employer may be
found to have violated section 8(a)(5), and, if so, the Board will issue a
bargaining order. An order to bargain with a union which does not represent
a majority of the employees will not maximize employee free choice as
guided by the majority rule principle of section 9(a) of the Act. 5
11 See, e.g., Stoner Rubber Co., 123 N.L.R.B. 1440, 1444 (1959) (stating that it
was not "unreasonable to assume that none of the. . . permanent replacements were
union adherents").
32 R. GORMAN, supra note 11, at 112.
3 NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 110 S. Ct. 1542, 1555 (1990)
(Rehnquist, C.IL, concurring).
14 NLRB v. Tahoe Nugget, Inc., 584 F.2d 293, 300 (9th Cir. 1978) ("If union
support is lacking, the employer's action actually furthers the cause of employee
democracy by overcoming the inertia which helps maintain the status quo."), cert.
denied, 442 U.S. 921 (1979); Comment, supra note 25, at 732.
11 29 U.S.C. § 159(a); see supra note 22 and accompanying text. The inhibiting
effect of a bargaining order on employee free choice is shown by the following statement
by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit:
[Vol. 52:919
1991] CURTIN MATHESON
The Gorman presumption has been criticized, however, for leading to
industrial instability. 6 Professor Samuel Estreicher refers to the need for
industrial stability as a need for "bounded conflict."37 According to the
principle of bounded conflict, "while economic conflict is an essential,
legitimate feature of our collective bargaining system, a strike should
ordinarily not provide an occasion for terminating the bargaining
relationship. The strike is a means of resolving a dispute, not destroying the
underlying bargaining structure." 8 Because the Gorman presumption makes
it easier for an employer to use the occasion of a strike to eliminate the
union, it violates the principle of bounded conflict, thus leading to industrial
instability.
2. The Striker Replacement Presumption
From 1975 to 1987 the Board employed, with some wavering, the
striker replacement presumption under which the Board presumed "that
permanent strike replacements hired during a strike support the union in the
same ratio as the striking employees whom they replaced." 39 Even a
proponent of the striker replacement presumption has referred to it as
After a bargaining order is entered, there is a "reasonable period," similar to the
year after a Union is initially certified, during which no decertification petition will
be considered. Then, if a contract is signed, which seems likely to occur in the
course of a year of bargaining, the three-year contract bar would stymie any attempt
by the employees to choose another Union or decertify the present Union, unless the
Board were to provide for an exception to its normal rules.
Peoples Gas Sys., Inc. v. NLRB, 629 F.2d 35, 45 n.17 (D.C. Cir. 1980). See Comment,
supra note 25, at 732-33.
11 See, e.g., Flynn, The Economic Strike Bar: Looking Beyond the "Union
Sentiments" of Permanent Replacements, 61 TEMP. L. Q. 691, 704-06 (1988).
" Estreicher, supra note 13, at 288.
38 Id.
39 Station KKHI, 284 N.L.R.B. 1339, 1340 (1987), enforced, 891 F.2d 230 (9th
Cir. 1989) (citing Penneo, Inc., 250 N.L.R.B. 716 (1980)). The Board's first use of the
striker replacement presumption occurred in Cutten Supermarket, 220 N.L.R.B. 507
(1975). Although the Board briefly seemed to abandon the presumption as "wholly
unwarranted and unrealistic" in Arkay Packaging Corp., 227 N.L.R.B. 397 (1976),
review denied sub nom. N.Y. Printing Pressmen & Offset Workers Union v. NLRB, 575
F.2d 1045 (2d Cir. 1978), it has reaffirmed it many times since. See, e.g., Windham
Community Memorial Hosp., 230 N.L.R.B. 1070 (1977), enforced 577 F.2d 805 (2d
Cir. 1978); Pennco, Inc., 250 N.L.R.B. 716 (1980), enforced 684 F.2d 340 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 994 (1982). The striker replacement presumption was abolished
by the Board in Station KKHI, 284 N.L.R.B. at 1340.
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"patently absurd" and "counterfactual."' The value of the striker
replacement presumption is that it serves the goal of industrial stability, i.e.,
it puts bounds on the conflict. If the striker replacement presumption is
employed by the Board, an employer's showing that permanent replacements
make up at least fifty percent of the bargaining unit will not be sufficient to
support the employer's good-faith doubt that the union lacks majority support
because the Board will presume that the replacements support the union.
Therefore, such a showing will not justify the employer's refusal to bargain
with or recognize the union. Thus, the striker replacement presumption
assures that an employee strike and an employer's subsequent hiring of
permanent replacements "do not routinely lead to the obliteration of
bargaining relationships."41
The striker replacement presumption obtains industrial stability, but not
without a price; the price is the nonmaximization of employee free choice.
Consider, for example, a situation in which a bargaining unit composed of
ten employees goes on strike. The employer hires ten permanent
replacements and then refuses to bargain any longer with the incumbent
union on the grounds that the employer has a reasonable good-faith doubt of
the union's majority status. Using the striker replacement presumption, the
Board would presume that the ten replacements favor the union despite the
fact that the union will undoubtedly negotiate for their ouster.42 The Board
would order the employer to bargain with the incumbent union. If the
replacements in fact oppose the union, the bargaining order inhibits their free
choice.43
3. The Station KKHI Nonpresumption
The Board's striker replacement presumption met rejection in the Courts
of Appeals." In 1987 in Station KKHI the Board abolished the presumption,
o Estreicher, supra note 13, at 293.
I' d. (emphasis added).
42 See Estreicher, supra note 13, at 292-93.
'3 See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
44SeeNLRB v. Randle-Eastern Ambulance Serv., Inc., 584 F.2d 720,728 (5th Cir.
1978); Soule Glass & Glazing Co. v. NLRB, 652 F.2d 1055, 1110 (1st Cir. 1981);
National Car Rental Sys., Inc. v. NLRB, 594 F.2d 1203, 1206 (8th Cir. 1979). But see
NLRB v. Windham Community Memorial Hosp., 577 F.2d 805, 813 (2d Cir. 1978)
(enforcing Board order but refusing to adopt the striker replacement presumption or the
Gorman presumption); NLRB v. Pennco, Inc., 684 F.2d 340 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 994 (1982) (enforcing Board order but refusing to adopt the striker replacement
presumption or the Gorman presumption).
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finding that it had "no articulated basis in reason or policy" and "no
evidentiary or empirical basis."" However, the Board did not return to its
former Gorman presumption, favored by the Courts of Appeals, because the
Board found it to be "equally unsupportable."' Instead, the Board stated
that because it could not "discern [any] overriding generalization about the
views held by strike replacements" it would "decline to maintain or create
any presumptions regarding their union sentiments" and would rather,
"review the facts of each case," requiring "some further evidence of union
nonsupport."47 In Curtin Matheson, the Supreme Court gave its approval
to the Board's new "nonpresumption."
IfI. NLRB v. CURTIN MATHESON ScIENTIFIc, INC.
A. The Facts
The dispute between Curtin Matheson and the union began in May of
1979 when a collective bargaining agreement between the parties expired.
Negotiations proved fruitless; when the union rejected the employer's final
offer, the employer locked out the twenty-seven bargaining unit employees.
When the employer ended the lockout and reiterated its last offer, the union
again rejected the offer and instituted an economic strike.48
Five of the twenty-seven bargaining unit employees immediately crossed
the picket line and returned to work. Then on June 25, the employer hired
twenty-nine permanent replacements for the twenty-two striking employees.
The record contains no evidence that either the crossovers or the
replacements were subject to violence or threats by the strikers. Although the
union terminated the strike on July 16 and offered to accept unconditionally
the employer's final offer, the employer stated that the offer was no longer
open. Furthermore, the employer withdrew its recognition of the union on
the basis that it had a good-faith doubt of the union's majority status. When
the union requested information from the employer regarding the number of
" Station KKHI, 284 N.L.R.B. at 1344.
46 Id.
"The National Labor Relations Board determines on an ad hoc discretionary basis
whether or not to acquiesce in the views of national labor law and policy articulated by
the various federal circuit courts of appeals." Modjeska, The NLRB Litigational
Processes: A Response to Chairman Dotson, 23 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 399 (1989).
"I Station KKHI, 284 N.L.R.B. at 1344 (quoting NLRB v. Pennco, 684 F.2d 340,
343 (6th Cir. 1982)).
48 Curtin Matheson, 110 S. Ct. at 1547. See supra note 12 regarding economic
strikers.
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bargaining unit employees and the job classification and seniority of each
employee, the employer refused to provide it.49
In response to the employer's withdrawal of recognition, refusal to
bargain, and refusal to provide information, the union filed 8(a)(5) and (1)
charges with the Board.' The employer invoked the good-faith doubt
defense, and the Administrative Law Judge ("AL"), finding that the
employer had a reasonable good-faith doubt, dismissed the complaint.51 On
appeal, the Board applied its Station KKfII nonpresumption and rejected the
opinion of the AU, holding that the employer did not satisfy the good-faith
doubt test.52 The Fifth Circuit denied enforcement of the Board order,53
and the Supreme Court granted certiorari "to resolve a circuit split on the
question whether the Board must presume that striker replacements oppose
the union. "'
B. Analysis of the Case
Justice Marshall wrote the opinion of the Court in a 5-4 decision
reversing the judgment of the Court of Appeals and enforcing the order of
the Board. The Court's opinion is marked by great deference to the expertise
of the Board in recognition that the Board "has the primary responsibility for
developing and applying national labor policy." 55 The Court reviewed the
Board's nonpresumption using a deferential standard under which "[the
Court] will uphold a Board rule as long as it is rational and consistent with
the Act."56
4 Curtin Matheson, 110 S. Ct. at 1547.
I d. See supra note 19.
s' Curtin Matheson, 110 S. Ct. at 1547.
s Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 287 N.L.R.B. 350 (1987), enforcement denied,
859 F.2d 362 (5th Cir. 1988), rev'd, 110 S. Ct. 1542 (1990).
" Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc. v. NLRB, 859 F.2d 362 (5th Cir. 1988), rev'd,
110 S. Ct. 1542 (1990).
A Curtin Matheson, 110 S. Ct. at 1548-49.
I d. at 1549.
56 Id. (citing Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27, 42
(1987)).
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Scalia, with whom Justices O'Connor and Kennedy
joined, argued that the proper standard of review is provided by the substantial evidence
rule; the court should determine "whether there was substantial evidence to support the
Board's conclusion that respondent had not established a reasonable good-faith doubt of
the union's majority status." Id. at 1562 (Scalia, J., dissenting). See Administrative
ProcedureAct, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E); Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474,
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The Court found the Board's nonpresumption to be "rational as an
empirical matter.""' The Court accepted the Board's reasoning that,
although it may be true that most replacements oppose the union, it cannot
be presumed that this is inevitably so. A replacement may cross the union's
picket line, not out of opposition to the union, but due to financial hardship.
Or, a replacement "may disagree with the purpose or strategy of the
particular strike and refuse to support that strike, while still wanting that
union's representation at the bargaining table."s While picket line violence
and union demands for ouster of replacements may create a situation in which
the interests of strikers and replacements are "diametrically opposed,"59
these factors are not always present. Curtin Matheson itself provides an
example of a situation in which these factors were not present.' The Court
concluded, therefore, that it is rational for the Board not to presume that
replacements oppose the union.61
488 (1951) (a court must set aside a Board decision when it "cannot conscientiously find
that the evidence supporting that decision is substantial, when viewed in the light that the
record in its entirety furnishes, including the body of evidence opposed to the Board's
view").
The Court countered Scalia's criticism by noting that it granted certiorari on the
question of "[w]hether the Board permissibly refused to adopt a general presumption
applicable to all cases of this type" and not on "an evidentiary question concerning the
facts of this particular case." Curtin Matheson, 110 S. Ct. at 1545 n.2.
-7 Curtin Matheson, 110 S. Ct. at 1550. While voting with the Court, Justice
Rehnquist noted in his concurring opinion that "[t]he Board's 'no-presumption' rule
seems . . . to press to the limit the deference to which the Board is entitled in assessing
industrial reality. . . ." Id. at 1554 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
" Id. at 1550. In criticizing the Court for accepting the Board's view of industrial
reality, Justice Scalia stated:
The question is not whether replacement employees accept employment for economic
reasons. Undoubtedly they do-the same economic reasons that would lead them to
oppose the union that will likely seek to terminate their employment. Nor is the
question whether replacements would like to be represented by a union. Some
perhaps would. But what the employer is required to have a good-faith doubt about
is majority support, not for "union representation" in the abstract, but for
representation by this particular complainant union, at the time the employer
withdrew recognition from the union.
Id. at 1560 (Scalia, I., dissenting).
-1 Id. at 1550.
60 Id. at 1552 n.9.
61 Id. at 1553.
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The Court denied any inconsistency between the Board's
nonpresumption as to replacements' union sentiments and the Board's
doctrines expressed in Service Electric Co.62 and Leveld Wholesale, Inc.63
In Service Electric and Leveld, the Board held that an employer is not
obligated under section 8(a)(5) of the Act to bargain with the union
concerning the employment terms of permanent replacements.' The Board
offered two justifications in support of this doctrine. First, to require the
employer to bargain with the union in regard to the replacements' terms of
employment "would be to nullify the [employer's] right to hire
replacements."' The Board was not willing to take such a step. Second,
and more importantly, to require an employer to bargain with the union
regarding the replacements' employment terms would impose upon the union
the "concomitant obligation"' under section 8(b)(3) of the Act67 to bargain
with the employer in the best interests of the replacements.68 The Board in
both Service Electric and Leveld saw this as problematic because "it is not
logical to expect [the union] 'to negotiate in the best interests of strike
replacements during the pendency of a strike, where the strikers are on the
picket line."'" In sum, the Board refused to impose an obligation on the
union to bargain in the best interests of the replacements because the interests
of the replacements are "diametrically opposed" to those of the strikers, to
whom the union already owes a bargaining duty.7'
The doctrine expressed in Service Electric and Leveld seems patently
inconsistent with the Board's view in Station KKHI and Curtin Matheson that
it "[could] discern no overriding generalization about the views held by strike
replacements." 7' Justice Blackmun in his dissenting opinion in Curtin
a 281 N.L.R.B. 633 (1986).
63 218 N.L.R.B. 1344 (1975).
4Service Electric, 281 N.L.R.B. at 639; Leveld, 218 N.L.R.B. at 1350.
65 Service Electric, 281 N.L.R.B. at 637 (quoting Times Publishing Co., 72
N.L.R.B. 676, 684 (1947)). See NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345
(1938); see supra note 13 and accompanying text.
' Service Electric, 281 N.L.R.B. at 639.
67 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(3). Section 8(b)(3) of the Act makes it an unfair labor practice
for a union "to refuse to bargain collectively with an employer." Service Electric, 281
N.L.R.B. at 639.
68 Service Electric, 281 N.L.R.B. at 638; Leveld, 218 N.L.R.B. at 1350.
69 Service Electric, 281 N.L.R.B. at 539 (quoting Leveld, 218 N.L.R.B. at 1350).
70 Id. at 634.
", Station KKHI, 284 N.L.R.B. at 1344; Curtin Matheson, 287 N.L.R.B. at 352.
[Vol. 52:919
CURTIN MATHESON
Matheson stated that the Board's failure to explain this inconsistency was, in
itself, enough to invalidate the order of the Board.72
Attempting to reconcile the doctrine that the union cannot be obligated
to bargain in the best interests of the replacements with the doctrine that
replacements cannot be presumed to oppose the union, Justice Marshall,
writing for the Court, stated:
[E]ven if the interests of strikers and replacements conflict during the
strike, those interests may converge after the strike, once job rights have
been resolved. Thus, while the strike continues, a replacement worker
whose job appears relatively secure might well want the union to continue
to represent the unit regardless of the union's bargaining posture during
the strike. Surely replacement workers are capable of looking past the
strike in considering whether or not they desire representation by the
union . 3
Although this attempt at reconciliation may not inspire great confidence,74
it does find support in the language of Service Electric and Leveld. In both
cases the Board noted that it was "during the pendency of the strike," as
opposed to after the strike, that the interests of the strikers and replacements
were in opposition.7'
In commenting on Curtin Matheson, several avenues are open. First,
one could, as does Justice Scalia in his dissent, dispute the fact-finding of the
7 Curtin Matheson, 110 S. Ct. at 1556 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See also Greater
Boston Television Corp. v. F.C.C., 444 F.2d 841, 852 (D.C. Cir. 1970) ("[A]n agency
changing its course must supply a reasoned analysis indicating that prior policies and
standards are being deliberately changed, not casually ignored, and if an agency glosses
over or swerves from prior precedents without discussion it may cross the line from the
tolerably terse to the intolerably mute.") (footnote omitted), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923
(1971).
' Curtin Matheson, 110 S. Ct. at 1552 (emphasis added).
71 In response to the Court's statement (see supra text accompanying note 73),
Justice Scalia stated:
"Replacement workers are capable of looking past the strike in considering
whether or not they desire representation by the union,". . . in the same way
that a man who is offered one million dollars to jump off a cliff is capable of
looking past the probable consequence of his performance to contemplate how
much fun he would have with one million dollars if he should survive.
Id. at 1562 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 1552).
7S Leveld, 218 N.L.R.B. at 1350; Service Electric, 281 N.L.R.B. at 639 (quoting
Leveld, 218 N.L.R.B. at 1350).
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Board and the Court.76 Second, one could, as does Justice Blackmun in his
dissent, criticize the Board's sloppy articulation of its reasons for adopting
the nonpresumption. However, this author has chosen a third avenue. This
Comment will accept the Court's conclusion that creation of the
nonpresumption is within the power of the Board and will then analyze the
effects of the nonpresumption on the good-faith doubt defense.
IV. EFFECT OF THE NONPREsUMPTION ON THE
GOOD-FAITH DOUBT DEFENSE: THE EMPLOYER
MUST PRODUCE "FURTHER EVIDENCE" OF
ANTI-UNION SENTIMENT
In Station KKHI the Board concluded that its past striker replacement
presumption was "wholly unwarranted and unrealistic"' and that such a
presumption had "no articulated basis in reason or policy"78 and "no
evidentiary or empirical basis."79 How ironic it is then that the
nonpresumption, which the Board has substituted for the now discredited
striker replacement presumption, operates within the good-faith doubt defense
in basically the same way as its predecessor.' The Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals cited this as the main reason for its rejection of the nonpresumption
when it denied enforcement of the Board's order in Curtin Matheson."
Previously, the Fifth Circuit in NLRB v. Randle-Eastern Ambulance
Service' had considered the Board's striker replacement presumption and
76 Curtin Matheson, 110 S. Ct. at 1560 (stating that any "reasonable factfinder"
would have to conclude that Curtin Matheson had a reasonable good-faith doubt of the
union's majority status) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
I Station KKHI, 284 N.L.R.B. at 1343 (quoting Arkay Packaging Corp., 227
N.L.R.B. 397 (1976), review denied sub nom. N.Y. Printing Pressmen & Offset Workers
Union v. NLRB, 575 F.2d 1045 (2d Cir. 1978)).
78 Station KKHI, 284 N.L.R.B. at 1344.
7 Id. See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
0 The nonpresumption operates in basically the same way as the striker replacement
presumption does, but not exactly the same way. The similarity is due to the fact that
both result in the employer having to produce "further evidence." However, the striker
replacement presumption, under which the Board views the replacements as pro-union,
and not simply neutral, would seem more clearly to require direct proof that employees
had "expressed desires" to repudiate the union in order to rebut the presumption of union
majority support. See Johns-Manville Sales Corp. v. NLRB, 906 F.2d 1428, 1433 n.l1
(10th Cir. 1990).
81 Curtin Matheson, 859 F.2d at 367.
2 584 F.2d 720 (5th Cir. 1978).
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had rejected it due to its counterfactual nature.' The court instead adopted
the Gorman presumption." In Curtin Matheson, faced with the Board's
Station KKHI nonpresumption, the court stated that it "d[id] not agree that
Station KKHI establishes a new standard because operationally the Station
KKHI standard has the same effect as" the striker replacement
presumption.' Under either the striker replacement presumption or the new
nonpresumption, the mere fact that a certain number of employees are
permanent replacements will not support the employer's good-faith doubt that
these employees oppose the union. Rather, some "further evidence" of
replacements' anti-union sentiments will be required.86
This point may be demonstrated by an examination of the effect of the
striker replacement presumption and the effect of the nonpresumption in the
factual context of Curtin Matheson. At the time Curtin Matheson refused to
bargain with the union, the bargaining unit was composed of twenty-five
striker replacements as well as five crossovers and nineteen strikers.' When
invoking the good-faith doubt defense, the employer pointed to its hiring of
the twenty-five permanent replacements as an objective factor supporting its
good-faith doubt in the union's majority representative status.88
Using the striker replacement presumption, one would presume that the
replacements favored the union in the same proportion as those they
replaced. Because all unit members are generally presumed to favor the
union, the replacements must also be presumed to favor the union.
Therefore, armed only with this piece of objective evidence, the employer
I Id. at 728. The Fifth Circuit in Randle-Eastern approached the question of the
validity of the Board's nonpresumption as a question of whether the Board's factual
inference (as opposed to presumption of law) regarding the union sentiments of
replacements was supported by substantial evidence. It concluded that it was not. Id. at
728-29. This is the same approach taken by Justice Scalia and those who joined him in
his Curtin Matheson dissent. See Curtin Matheson, 110 S. Ct. at 1542 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
14Randle-Eastern, 584 F.2d at 728. See supra notes 28-38 and accompanying text.
85 Curtin Matheson, 859 F.2d at 367. In Tube Craft, Inc., 289 N.L.R.B. 862
(1988), the Board affirmed an ALI's finding that an employer had not established
sufficient objective evidence to support a good-faith doubt of union nonsupport. The
Board noted that, although the ALI had applied the striker replacement presumption and
not the newly established nonpresumption of Station KKfJI, this would not alter the
outcome of the good-faith doubt test. Id. at 862 n.2.
86 Station KKHI, 284 N.L.R.B. at 1344 (quoting NLRB v. Pennco, Inc., 684 F.2d
340 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 994 (1982)).
7 Curtin Matheson, 110 S. Ct. at 1547.
88 The employer urged the Board and then the Court to adopt the Gorman
presumption. Id. at 1550. See supra notes 28-38 and accompanying text.
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could not overcome the general presumption of union majority support."
The employer must produce some "further evidence of union non-support"
in order to rebut this presumption 0
On the other hand, using the nonpresumption, one would look at the
employer's evidence as a nullity. From the fact that the employer hired these
twenty-five employees as striker replacements, one could not presume that
they either favor or oppose the union. However, because even under the
nonpresumption "the general presumption of continuing union majority
applies," 91 the effect of the employer's evidence is the same as it was under
the striker replacement presumption: it will not rebut the continuing
presumption of union majority status. Rather, to rebut the presumption,
"some further evidence of union non-support" will be required.'
V. THE GOOD-FAITH DOUBT DEFENSE AFTER
CURTIN MATHESON: WHAT "FURTHER EVIDENCE"
WILL BE REQUIRED?
What "further evidence" will suffice to satisfy the employer's burden of
producing objective evidence to support his good-faith doubt of union
majority status? If the good-faith doubt test is to survive Curtin Matheson,
there must potentially be some circumstantial evidence of the replacements'
anti-union sentiments which the employer could produce in order to support
his good-faith doubt and defend against the 8(a)(5) charge.'m If, however,
the Board is requiring the employer to produce direct evidence of the
replacements' anti-union sentiments, i.e., requiring the employer to "make
a numerical showing that a majority of employees in fact oppose the union,"
then this amounts to a forsaking of the good-faith doubt defense.' The
Board would be requiring the employer to prove lack of majority support in
fact.95
9 See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
9 Station KKHI, 284 N.L.R.B. at 1344 (quoting Pennco, 684 F.2d at 343).
91 Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc. v. NLRB, 859 F.2d 362, 367 (5th Cir. 1988).
9 Station KKHI, 284 N.L.R.B. at 1344 (quoting Pennco, 684 F.2d at 343).
93 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5). See supra note 19.
14 Curtin Matheson, 110 S. Ct. at 1550 n.8.
11 If the Board requires the employer to produce direct evidence of lack of majority
status, then there is no "good-faith doubt defense." "'Direct' describes evidence which,
if accepted as genuine or believed true, necessarily established the point for which it is
offered." C. MUELLER & L. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE UNDER THE RULEs 60 (1988). For
example, if the employer in Curtin Matheson presented evidence that the 25 replacements
came to him and individually made statements repudiating the union as their
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Sections A and B will compare the Curtin Matheson majority's view of
the Board's treatment of circumstantial evidence of the replacements' union
sentiments, such as picket line violence by strikers and union demands for
the discharge of replacements, with the Board's treatment of such evidence
in Johns-Manville Sales Corp.' Section C will look at signs in Johns-
Manville that the Board is requiring an employer to produce direct evidence
of the replacements' anti-union sentiments, thereby collapsing the good-faith
doubt defense into the proof-in-fact rule.
A. Circumstantial Evidence as "Further Evidence" of Anti-union
Sentiment in Curtin Matheson
For the good-faith doubt defense to remain a "good-faith doubt"
defense, rather than collapsing into the proof-in-fact rule, there must be some
kind of circumstantial evidence regarding the replacements' anti-union
sentiments that would be considered by the Board to be sufficient to support
an employer's good-faith doubt. In Curtin Matheson, the Court maintains that
the Board's position is merely that "the hiring of permanent replacements
who cross a picket line, in itself, does not support an inference that the
replacements repudiate the union as collective-bargaining representative. "'
As the Court views the Board's approach, the Board will consider the
employer's hiring of permanent replacements to be relevant if certain
circumstantial evidence-picket line violence and/or the union's demand for
ouster of the replacements-is produced from which the replacements' union
sentiments may be inferred.98
representative, this would be evidence which "if accepted as genuine" would "necessarily
establish[] the point for which it is offered," namely, that the 25 replacements oppose the
union. Id. This is proof-in-fact and has nothing to do with the employer's doubt.
"'Circumstantial' means evidence which, even if fully credited, may nevertheless
fail to support (let alone establish) the point in question, simply because an alternative
explanation seems as probable or more so ... ." Id. This circumstantial evidence may
establish a point if "alternative explanations [are] so much less likely than the one
advanced by the proponent as to seem preposterous.. . ." Id. at 60-61. For example,
in IT Services, 263 N.L.R.B. 1183 (1982), the employer presented the circumstantial
evidence that the striker replacements were subjected to violence and threats by the
strikers, and the Board found that this circumstantial evidence established the
replacements opposition to the union. Id. at 1187-88.
96 289 N.L.R.B. 40 (1988).
97 Curin Matheson, 110 S. Ct. at 1552 (quoting Station KKHI, 284 N.L.R.B. 1339,
1344 (1987) (empahsis added in Cuitin Matheson).
98 Curtin Matheson, 110 S. Ct. at 1552.
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In both Station KKHI and Curtin Matheson, the Board has indicated,
somewhat indirectly, that evidence of picket line violence will serve this
purpose. In Station KKHI, the Board stated that it could not "ascertain the
replacements' union sentiments... from their having crossed a peaceful and
sporadic picket line."' One can infer from this statement that, had the
replacements crossed a hostile picket line, the Board may have been able to
ascertain their union sentiments. In Curtin Matheson, the Board noted that
the record contained no evidence of picket line violence directed toward the
replacements and used this fact to distinguish the situation in Curtin
Matheson from that in NLRB v. Randle Eastern Ambulance Service, Inc."°
In Randle Eastern, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that replacements
could be presumed to oppose the union and that this is "especially true"''
when the replacements face picket line violence or when the union demands
their discharge.
IT Services"° provides an example of a case in which the Board
inferred from striker violence aimed at replacements that the replacements
opposed the union. The violence is described as follows:
Throughout the strike pickets spat on replacements, broke the windows of
employees' cars as they entered and left the yard, put nails in the
driveways, punctured tires of company and employee cars, and threw beer
bottles and rocks at employees and management officials. These events
occurred almost on a daily basis. Pickets called the strike replacements
"black bastards" and "nigger. "103
The ALU, whose opinion the Board adopted, concluded that the level of
violence was so high that the employer could rationally presume that those
subjected to it "did not desire to make the perpetrator of that conduct their
agent for bargaining. " "
A union demand that replacements be ousted is also listed by the Curtin
Matheson majority as the type of circumstantial evidence the Board "has not
deemed ... irrelevant to its evaluation of replacements' attitudes toward the
union."' 5 In both Station KKHI and Curtin Matheson, cases in which the
9 Station KKFII, 294 N.L.R.B. at 1345.
100 Curtin Matheson, 287 N.L.R.B. at 353 n.11 (distinguishing NLRB v. Randle-
Eastern Ambulance Serv., Inc., 584 F.2d 720 (5th Cir. 1978)).
101 Randle-Eastern, 584 F.2d at 728.
102 ITServs., 263 N.L.R.B. 1183 (1982).
103 Id. at 1187 (footnote omitted).
104 Id. at 1188.
"I Curtin Matheson, 110 S. Ct. at 1552.
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employer did not come up with sufficient "further evidence," the union was
not negotiating for the replacements removal at the time of the employer's
refusal to bargain." 6 This is in contrast to IT Services in which the union
made an "adamant demand" that the replacements be ousted.107 The ALJ
and Board in IT Services viewed this demand as circumstantial evidence that
the replacements opposed the union. Based on this contrast, the Curtin
Matheson majority concluded that "such demands [for ouster of
replacements] will be a factor in the Board's analysis" in "most" cases in
which the union has made such demands." 8
B. Exclusion of Circumstantial Evidence as "Further Evidence" in
Johns-Manville Sales Corp. v. NLRB
Although the Board's decisions in Station KKHI and Curtin Matheson
and the Supreme Court's opinion in Curtin Matheson indicate that the Board
will find an employer's evidence of picket line or strike-related violence
and/or union demands for replacement ouster to be relevant to the question
of the replacements' union sentiments, it is not entirely clear that this is so.
As Justice Rehnquist warns in his Curtin Matheson concurrence:
Although the Board's opinion in this case does not preclude a finding of
good-faith doubt based on circumstantial evidence, some recent decisions
suggest that it now requires an employer to show that individual
employees have "expressed desires" to repudiate the incumbent union in
order to establish a reasonable doubt of the union's majority status."
One of the cases referred to by Justice Rehnquist as imposing a
requirement that the employer present evidence that "employees have
'expressed desires' to repudiate the incumbent union" is Johns-Manville Sales
Corp."' The Board issued its Johns-Manville opinion on June 27, 1988,
about seven months after its decision in Curtin Matheson. In Johns-Manville,
the employer, charged with violations of sections 8(a)(5) and (1), defended
by presenting numerous objective factors in support of its good-faith doubt
106 Id.
17 Id. at 1553. See ITServs., 263 N.L.R.B. at 1185-86.
108 Curtin Matheson, 110 S. Ct. at 1553 n.11.
109 Id. at 1555 (Rehnquist, C.J, concurring). See Tube Craft, Inc., 289 N.L.R.B.
862 n.2 (1988); Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 289 N.L.R.B. 358 (1988), enforcement
denied, 906 F.2d 1428 (10th Cir. 1990); Tile, Terrazzo & Marble Contractors Assoc.,
287 N.L.R.B. 769 n.2 (1987).
11 Curtin Matheson, 110 S. Ct. at 1555. Johns-Manville, 289 N.L.R.B. 358.
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of the union's majority status. These objective factors included: 1) the
employer's hiring of 267 replacement workers in a 509 member bargaining
unit; 2) striker violence, threats, and property damage aimed at replacements;
3) the union's demand that all strikers be reinstated and that the replacement
workers be discharged, if necessary; 4) a decertification petition signed by
211 replacement workers; and 5) comments by replacements to the plant
manager and supervisor repudiating the union."'
In rejecting the AlJ's finding that the employer had sufficient objective
evidence to support its good-faith doubt, the Board applied its
nonpresumption as to the replacements' union sentiments."' It concluded
that the fact that the 509 member bargaining unit included 267 replacement
workers at the time of the employer's refusal to bargain was not sufficient
to establish the reasonableness of the employer's good-faith doubt.113
The Board then analyzed the employer's "further evidence." Extensive
evidence of striker picket line violence was presented by the employer and
accepted by the Board. 14 The Board found that it could not conclude, as
it had in IT Services, that the replacements subjected to this violence
necessarily opposed the union. 5 The Board found the Johns-Manville
violence to be less outrageous than that in IT Services."' Therefore, the
employer's evidence of striker violence toward replacements was not
sufficient "further evidence" of the replacements' anti-union sentiments. The
Board justified its discounting of the evidence of striker violence aimed at
replacements by stating that "[the employer] here had available other, more
reliable factors, including the list for the decertification petition and the
statements from identified employees, which could have indicated more
tangibly majority employee dissatisfaction with the union, but as we have
found, fell short of doing so. "17
The employer in Johns-Manville also presented evidence that the union
was negotiating with Johns-Manville for the ouster of the permanent
replacements."' As noted previously, the Curtin Matheson majority
indicated its belief that "such demands will be a factor in the Board's
.. Johns-Manville, 289 N.L.R.B. at 360-61.
1 2 Id. at 361.
113 Id.
114 Id.
.. Id. See IT Servs., 263 N.L.R.B. at 1187. See also supra notes 102-04 and
accompanying text.
1 6 Johns-Manville, 289 N.L.R.B. at 361.
117 Id. at 361-62.
" Id. at 362.
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analysis. '  However, the Johns-Manville Board did not view this
evidence as a factor in its analysis because a union's demand for discharge
of replacements "does not automatically prove that the Union abandoned the
replacements or that the replacements do not have any desire for union
representation.""°
Thus, although the Court in Curtin Matheson indicated its belief that the
Board will consider circumstantial evidence, such as picket line violence and
a union's demand of the ouster of replacements, as relevant when applying
the good-faith doubt defense, the Board's analysis in Johns-Manville puts this
in doubt.
C. A Requirement that the Good-Faith Doubt Defense Be Supported by
Direct Evidence Means the Collapse of the Good-Faith Doubt Defense
into the Proof-in-Fact Rule
After the Johns-Manville Board discounted the employer's circumstantial
evidence of the lack of employee support for the union, it showed a
"preoccupation with a head count" when examining the direct evidence that
the employer submitted."' As part of its direct evidence in support of its
good-faith doubt, the employer submitted a decertification petition signed by
211 replacements.1"  Only 204 of the signatures were legible."m  A
decertification petition asserts that the union which has been certified by the
Board as the collective bargaining representative for the unit "is no longer
a representative as defined in section 9(a)," in other words, the union no
longer enjoys majority support." In order to force an election, the petition
must contain the signatures of thirty percent of the employees in the
bargaining unit; the 204 signatures clearly met this standard. 5 In rejecting
119 Curtin Matheson, 110 S. Ct. at 1553 n.11.
"-
0Johns-Manville, 289 N.L.R.B. at 362.
2 Johns-Manville v. NLRB, 906 F.2d 1428, 1432 (10th Cir. 1990).
IJohns-Manville, 289 N.L.R.B. at 358.
'1 Id. at 359.
124 National Labor Relations Act § 9(c)(1)(A)(ii), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1)(A)(ii). See
29 U.S.C. § 159(a).
125 See NLRB Rules and Regulations § 101.18(a)(4) (setting 30% standard).
Even though the 204 signatures on the decertification petition clearly met the 30 %
standard, the Board did not conduct an election. This is because the union's filing of the
unfair labor practice charges against the employer "blocked" the election. In Hod
Carriers Local 840 (Blinne Constr. Co.), 135 N.L.R.B. 1153 (1962), the Board
explained its policy in regard to "blocking charges":
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the employer's evidence as insufficient to support a good-faith doubt of union
majority status, the Board stated that "at most, 217 employees out of a
combined total of approximately 509 strike replacements, returning strikers,
and strikers had repudiated the union."" The Board obtained the figure
of 217 by adding the 204 legible signatures on the decertification petition
with 13 other identified employee statements and comments indicating
repudiation. 27 Thus, the Board was "preoccupied" with the fact that the
204 signatures "did not constitute an absolute majority... of the bargaining
unit."" Such a preoccupation hardly seems consonant with a "good-faith
doubt" defense.
In denying enforcement of the Board's order, the Tenth Circuit Court
of Appeals characterized the Board's approach as a requirement that the
employer produce "direct proof" that a majority of his employees had
repudiated the union.129 Relying heavily on Justice Rehnquist's Curtin
Matheson concurrence, the Court of Appeals held that the Board had
"impermissibly limited the means by which the employer could establish
'good faith doubt.'"'" The Court of Appeals concluded, as does this
Comment, that an approach to the good-faith doubt defense which
"essentially require[s] proof of express anti-union statements by each
individual worker comprising a majority of the bargaining unit. . . leaves
little if anything of the good-faith doubt rule, effectively collapsing it into the
proof-in-fact rule. "131
A representation petition assumes an unresolved question concerning
representation. A Section 8(a)(5) charge, on the other hand, presupposes that
no such question exists and that the employer is wrongfully refusing to
recognize or bargain with a statutory bargaining representative. Because of
this basic inconsistency, the Board has over the years uniformly refused to
entertain representation petitions where a meritorious charge of refusal to
bargain has been filed and, indeed, has dismissed any representation petition
which may already have been on file.
Id. at 1166 n.24.
'
6 Johns-Manville, 289 N.L.R.B. at 361.
127 Id.
128 Johns-Manville Sales Corp. v. NLRB, 906 F.2d 1428, 1432 (10th Cir. 1990).
129 Id.
130 Id.
131 Id. at 1432-33.
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VI. CATcH-22: THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE
PROOF-IN-FACT RULE AND THE BOARD'S
SAFEGUARDS ON EMPLOYER POLLING
If indeed the Board has collapsed the good-faith doubt defense into the
proof-in-fact rule by requiring evidence that a majority of the employees have
"expressed desires" to repudiate the union, the Board has put an employer
seeking to defend against an 8(a)(5) charge in a very difficult position for
several reasons. First, the employer is required to prove a negative-that the
union lacks majority support. Second, key information that might help the
employer establish lack of support, such as union records, is in the hands of
the union, which is unlikely to share news of loss of employee support with
the employer."' Third, the employer is prohibited by section 8(a)(1) from
interrogating employees in regard to their union sentiments when such
interrogation might "lead to a perception on the part of the questioned
employee that a pro-union response may result in reprisals by the
employer."133
Finally, and most interestingly, the Board-created safeguards for
postcertification polling put the employer in a Catch-22 position."
Employers have attempted to produce evidence that a majority of the
employees in the bargaining unit repudiate the union by conducting polls of
their employees. 135 In 1974, the Board in Montgomery Ward & Co. held
that an employer could only conduct such a poll if it adhered to the Struksnes
132 Comment, supra note 25, at 736.
133 R. GORMAN, supra note 11, at 178.
134 J. HELLER, CATCH-22 (1961).
There was only one catch and that was Catch-22, which specified that a concern for
one's own safety in the face of dangers that were real and immediate was the process
of a rational mind. Orr was crazy and could be grounded. All he had to do was ask;
and as soon as he did, he would no longer be crazy and would have to fly more
missions. Orr would be crazy to fly more missions and sane if he didn't, but if he
was sane he had to fly them. If he flew them he was crazy and didn't have to; but
if he didn't want to he was sane and had to. Yossarian was moved very deeply by
the absolute simplicity of this clause of Catch-22 and let out a respectful whistle.
Id. at 46.
See, e.g., Mingtree Restaurant, Inc., 265 N.L.R.B. 409 (1982), enforcement
denied, 736 F.2d 1295 (9th Cir. 1984); Houston Shopping News Co., 233 N.L.R.B. 105,
107 (1977); Montgomery Ward & Co., 210 N.L.R.B. 717 (1974). See also Note,
Employer Postcertfi[cation Polls to Determine Union Support, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1770
(1986).
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Construction Co. safeguards, originally established for precertification
polling, and if the employer could establish by sufficient objective evidence
that it had a good-faith doubt of the union's majority status.136 This good-
faith doubt standard is the same standard that the employer must meet in
order to defeat an 8(a)(5) charge.137 Thus, while the employer cannot
withdraw recognition without having sufficient objective evidence to support
its good-faith doubt, it cannot poll its employees in order to obtain such
evidence unless it already has a good-faith doubt supported by such evidence.
In Justice Rehnquist's Curtin Matheson concurrence he stated that he had
"considerable doubt whether the Board may insist that good-faith doubt be
determined only on the basis of sentiments of employees, and at the same
time bar the employer from using what might be the only effective means of
determining those sentiments."' 38 However, this "considerable doubt" did
not sway Justice Rehnquist's vote because he felt that the issue was not yet
before the Court. 39 Likewise, the majority did not reach the issue of the
legitimacy of its good-faith doubt analysis when combined with its strictures
on employer polling, because it concluded that the Board does not require
direct evidence that a majority of the employees oppose the union.
VII. CONCLUSION
What is the effect of the Board's nonpresumption as to striker
replacements' union sentiments, established in Station KKHI and given
Supreme Court approval in Curtin Matheson, on the good-faith doubt
36 Montgomery Ward & Co., 210 N.L.R.B. 717,724-26. In Struksnes Constr. Co.,
165 N.L.R.B. 1062 (1967), the Board's holding was as follows:
Absent unusual circumstances, the polling of employees by an employer will be
violative of section 8(a)(1) of the Act unless the following safeguards are observed:
(1) the purpose of the poll is to determine the truth of a union's claim of majority,
(2) this purpose is communicated to the employees, (3) assurances against reprisal are
given, (4) the employees are polled by secret ballot, and (5) the employer has not
engaged in unfair labor practices or otherwise created a coercive atmosphere.
Id. at 1063.
137 Texas Petrochemicals Corp., 296 N.L.R.B. No. 136 (1989) (slip op. at 10).
'3 NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 110 S. Ct. 1542, 1555 (Rehnquist,
C.I., concurring). See also id. at 1556 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (noting concern over
the fact that, "while the Board appears to require that good-faith doubt be established by
express avowals of individual employees, other Board policies make it practically
impossible for the employer to amass direct evidence of its workers' views" (footnote
omitted)).
139 Id. at 1555 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
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defense? The answer is that the nonpresumption, like its predecessor, the
striker replacement presumption, requires the employer invoking the good-
faith doubt defense to produce some "further evidence" of employee
nonsupport of the union beyond the mere fact that the employee is a
replacement worker."4 If this "further evidence" can be circumstantial
evidence, such as the fact that the employee crossed a violent union picket
line or that the union demanded that the employer oust all replacements, then
the Curtin Matheson majority's position that the good-faith doubt defense
survives is certainly true. On the other hand, if the "further evidence" which
the Board requires of the employer is direct evidence of employee
repudiation of the union, then the good-faith doubt defense survives in name
only. 141
The Supreme Court has never considered whether the Board could
eliminate the good-faith doubt defense; the Board's power to do so "remains
an open question."42 Although the Curtin Matheson majority maintains
that the Board has not at this point in time "sub-silentio forsaken the good-
faith doubt standard," recent Board decisions, such as Johns-Manville, call
this conclusion into question. 143
If the Board requires an employer charged with violations of sections
8(a)(5) and (1) to produce evidence that a majority of its employees have
"expressed desires" to repudiate the union in order to rebut the presumption
of union majority support, then the Board will have collapsed the good-faith
doubt defense into the proof-in-fact rule. Even assuming that the Supreme
Court would hold, upon consideration of the issue, that the Board has the
power to eliminate the good-faith doubt defense, there remains a problem
with the Board's analysis: the Board would be requiring that the employer
prove lack of majority support in fact, but then, by other Board doctrines
concerning unlawful interrogation and postcertification polling, denying it the
means to obtain such proof.'" Two Justices and one Court of Appeals have
expressed doubt as to the legitimacy of such a Board position.'45
In light of these complications, the Board has at least three alternatives.
First, the Board could forsake its nonpresumption and return to the Gorman
14 See supra notes 77-92 and accompanying text.
141 See supra notes 93-131 and accompanying text.
'4 Curtin Matheson, 110 S. Ct. at 1557 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 1550 n.8.
I d. at 1550 n.8. See supra notes 109-31 and accompanying text.
144 See supra notes 132-39 and accompanying text.
"4 See Curtin Matheson, 110 S. Ct. at 1555 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring); id. at
1556 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Johns-Manville v. NLRB, 906 F.2d 1428, 1433 (10th
Cir. 1990).
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presumption, presuming that striker replacements oppose the union. 146 This
would be sure to revive the good-faith doubt defense and would do away
with the need for the employer to produce "further evidence" as long as it
could establish that replacements made up fifty percent of the bargaining
unit. Herein lies the problem: the Gorman presumption has been rightly
criticized as not conducive to industrial stability, a major goal of the Act,
because it makes it too easy for the employer to rid itself of the union after
a strike.147
A second alternative is for the Board to make proof of lack of union
majority support in fact the only defense to an 8(a)(5) charge.14 Then, to
avoid the Catch-22 situation which is a product of its strictures on employer
interrogation and polling of employees, the Board could lessen these
strictures. For example, the Board could eliminate the requirement that an
employer show good-faith doubt of majority status before conducting a
postcertification poll of its employees.149 However, such a course would be
unwise. Such strictures on an employer's methods of seeking information
from its employees in regard to their union sentiments serve the legitimate
purpose of preventing the creation of a coercive atmosphere.
The third, and in this author's opinion, best alternative, is for the Board
to maintain or adopt the position which the Curtin Matheson majority sees
it as having."i ' The Board should not presume either that replacements
oppose or support the union, but rather should require the employer to
produce further evidence of replacements' union sentiments. Circumstantial
evidence, such as striker violence and union demands for the ouster of
replacements, should be considered relevant and weighed cumulatively with
any direct evidence the employer may produce. Such a course will do justice
to both the need for industrial stability and the principle of maximization of
employee free choice."'
Diane Olinger
146 See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
147 See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
148 See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
149 See Montgomery Ward & Co., 210 N.L.R.B. 717 (1974); Texas Petrochemicals
Corp., 296 N.L.R.B. No. 136 (1989) (slip op. at 10).
" See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
151 See Comment, supra note 25; Estreicher, supra note 13.
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